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The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, by Leslie H. Gelb
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Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter "was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system—the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures—was designed to do, and it did it." The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter.
- Sales Rank: #548535 in Books
- Published on: 1979-03-01
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 9.02" h x .89" w x 5.98" l, 1.19 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 387 pages
From the Back Cover
When first published in 1979, four years after the end of one of the most
divisive conflicts in the United States, The Irony of Vietnam raised eyebrows. Most critics argued that the country had “stumbled into a quagmire in Vietnam through hubris and miscalculation,” as the New York Times put it. But Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, who had reviewed recently declassified White House and Defense Department documents, maintained that policymakers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had their eyes open, had based decisions on a thorough knowledge of what was possible on the ground, and knew the cost of action and inaction. Explains Fareed Zakaria in his foreword, those prosecuting the war chose “middle-of-the-road solutions,” for a variety of what seemed reasonable assumptions. The overall tenor of the era that shaped foreign policy—the belief in the domino theory and a strident anti-communism—restricted policymakers’ thinking and prevented a more flexible approach, however. And thereby lies a lesson for today's policymakers
About the Author
Leslie H. Gelb is President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former columnist at The New York Times, where he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for Explanatory Journalism. Gelb has worked as a senior official in the State and Defense departments. Richard K. Betts is a professor of political science at Columbia University. He was a Senior Fellow and Research Associate at the Brookings Institution and has taught at Harvard and the Johns Hopkins University's Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Professor Betts has also served on the staff of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and as a consultant to the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency. Professor Betts is a member of the National Commission on Terrorism.
Most helpful customer reviews
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful.
Classic Study of a Foreign Policy Disaster
By not me
Younger readers who were unfortunate enough to be raised on Reaganite myths of American power and exceptionalism might wonder how the U.S. ever became mired in and then lost a war in Vietnam, a small country of no strategic or economic significance to any countries except its immediate neighbors. Well, such readers need wonder no more. This is the book for them. It explains how foreign policy elites in Washington saw Vietnam as a test case of containment and not as a civil war between rival Vietnamese factions (the reality). It also shows how DC's ideological tunnel vision was compounded by White House fears of a right-wing McCarthy-ite backlash against Democrats if the U.S. "lost" another Asian country to communism. In other words, little Vietnam was crucified -- some two million Vietnamese were slaughtered -- because of strategic misconceptions and political self-interest in Washington. Irony, indeed. "The Irony of Vietnam" is fantastic. Written by a former DoD insider who helped compile the Pentagon Papers, the book is well-written and incredibly smart on the psychology, politics, cliches, and bureaucratic pathologies of American foreign policy-making. It's a great companion to Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest." All international relations students and historians of American foreign policy should read it. Six stars.
7 of 8 people found the following review helpful.
Excellent analysis of U.S. Foreign policy towards S.E. Asia, post world war II
By Bob Hoskins
Since 1945 through 197? the U.S. was in S.E. Asia; firstly financially, then advisory, then militarily. All cold war thinking with an eye on China and Russia to the east. Ho Chi Minh surfaced as the Communist liberator of his country shortly after WW II and, after routing the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, his perception as a serious threat to the eyes of the Western World took on more weight. The Domino theory became the sales pitch and American aid increased and increased. America increased support to the corrupt Diem regime in the south and, supported reneging free elections in 1956. Quagmire is an understatement. But, we have to remember, at the time, our leaders were reacting to an unfolding situation and their decisions were shaped by policy and events that were happening then. We have hindsight to benefit from and form our opinions.
Gelb & Betts have painstakingly pieced together hours and hours of research and created a very detailed analysis of Vietnam from World War II through the fall of Saigon in 1975. Their hypothesis is sound and supported concretely with credible sources.
This stuff is fascinating and highlights one major thing, the U.S. could never win given its self imposed limitations and fears concerning S. E. Asia. The U.S. escalated as reaction to the ever increasing power of the Vietcong and, other than bombing, U.S. plans never involved invading the north, Cambodia or Laos. The U.S. never really took control of the situation other than to react. This kept USA on its back foot and denied it the initiative. In a nutshell, the Vietnam war took place on the enemy's schedule and they protracted it knowing the U.S. would eventually tire.
The book is broken into 5 parts:
1. Decisions getting into Vietnam
2. Goals: The imperative Not to lose
3. Means: The minimum necessary and the Maximum feasible.
4. Perceptions: Realism, Hope and Compromise.
5. Conclusions.
Each part has 3 - 4 chapters within and the conclusion wraps up and summarizes all the analysis. It's very detailed and at times complex. If you want a first rate analysis of U.S. policy towards Asia, this is the book. I highly recommend it.
6 of 7 people found the following review helpful.
A Superb Book
By A Customer
This is an excellent, balanced, and well-written study of American foreign policy in Vietnam by two unusually able scholars. It refutes the modern mythology that LBJ and/or Nixon "dragged Congress kicking and screaming" into the conflict, and notes that a plurality of New Hampshire voters who supported McCarthy in Feb. 1968 went on to support George Wallace and Gen. Curtiss ("Bomb Hanoi back to the stone age") LeMay in the November election--that is, they were Hawks protesting a "no-win" policy rather than Doves who wanted to abandon South Vietnam to the Communists. Highly recommended.
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