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A firsthand account of how the Bush administration mismanaged its Afghan campaign, A Vulcan's Tale shines new and important light on the events and people behind the headlines in the immediate years following the September 11 attacks.
The "Vulcans," so named by Condoleezza Rice, were eight foreign policy experts who advised George W. Bush during his 2000 presidential campaign. After Bush assumed the presidency, the Vulcans helped shape the administration's foreign policy following 9/11, including the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. All were veterans of past administrations, having served under either Ronald Reagan or George H. W. Bush, and they included among their ranks Dov Zakheim. Made comptroller and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense in 2001, Zakheim was also named the DoD's coordinator for Afghan civilian reconstruction in 2002.
In A Vulcan's Tale, Zakheim draws on his own participation and intimate knowledge to analyze how the United States missed critical opportunities while it struggled to manage two wars, particularly the seemingly endless endeavor in Afghanistan. In his view, the Bush administration's disappointing results in Afghanistan were partly attributable to the enormity of the challenges, certainly. But flawed leadership and deficiencies of management, understanding, and forethought all played their parts as well.
The power of the purse proved to be especially damaging. The Office of Management and Budget was slow to fund Defense's efforts at the outset of the Afghan conflict and then inadequately funded the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, casting the die for several additional years of conflict. The invasion of Iraq siphoned off critical resources for Afghanistan, thereby further complicating that country's reconstruction.
Even with public policy of the highest order, the devil still lurked in the details, as the DoD's "money man" was soon to discover while he struggled to fund and manage the reconstruction of civilian Afghanistan. A Vulcan's Tale is an authoritative, candid but fair account of how a wise and admirable goal can be waylaid by insufficient funding and ineffective coordination, with the result of faulty—or, at best, incomplete—implementation.
- Sales Rank: #1864045 in Books
- Published on: 2011-05-26
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 9.49" h x 1.21" w x 6.48" l, 1.57 pounds
- Binding: Hardcover
- 335 pages
Review
"Dov Zakheim's unerringly honest and well-written book does two critical things. It gives us the best and closest look into how the Bush team operated in Afghanistan. It also gives us the best brief ever of how even the best policy succeeds or fails in the details, in the implementation."—Leslie H. Gelb, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations and New York Times columnist, former assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs
" A Vulcan's Tale is a lively and absorbing read. Dov Zakheim has spent decades working closely with the men and women who made U.S. foreign policy under George W. Bush. His tale of why the reconstruction of Afghanistan fell so short has the impact and credibility that only an insider's account can. But well beyond Afghanistan, this is a book for anyone who seeks to understand why our policy reach so often exceeds our grasp."—Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton University, former director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State
"Dov Zakheim is someone I have known and admired for many years. Make no mistake, this is a fascinating tale told by someone who not only is good at recounting a story that will be debated for many years to come, but also because he is honest to a fault. Zakheim takes the reader through the many twists and turns in the development of national policy that cost the United States dearly in terms of our most precious resources."—General James L. Jones, US MC (ret.), former national security adviser, former commander European Command, former commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps
"Zakheim has produced a must-read for policymakers and students of statecraft alike. In readable prose, he provides a reflective insider's account and analysis of the cost of lack of alignment between policy and implementation during the Bush administration. He convincingly argues that Afghanistan's tragedy was avoidable and that the inherited processes and structures of decisionmaking in Washington must change if the use of instruments of U.S. power is going to lead to productive outcomes for the world and the American public."—Ashraf Ghani, chairman, Afghan Transition Coordination Commission and former minister of finance, Afghanistan
" A Vulcan's Tale by Dov Zakheim is a great contribution to the memoirs emerging from the war on terrorism. Zakheim had two full-time jobs: He was the Pentagon's comptroller and its reconstruction coordinator. The reader will learn about the bureaucratic politics of financial management, the perils of nation-building, and the fascinating world of international fundraising. An outstanding tale, frankly told."—Joseph J. Collins, professor of national security strategy, National War College, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations
"This vivid and sobering account of intervention and nation-building experiences should be compulsory reading for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic."—Ana Palacio, former foreign affairs minister of Spain, former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group
"Zakheim traces the current travails in Afghanistan to a failure to convert the military successes of late 2001 into political gains that would aid the larger goal of nation building. He also conveys the daily frustrations of trying to make the U.S. policymaking system work sensibly.... A measured portrayal of the Bush administration's failings and of the personal clashes behind the debates over policy."—Foreign Affairs
"Although there are several prior works by Bush administration officials, Zakheim's discussion is powerful and unique. Recommended. Upperdivision undergraduate, graduate, and research collections."—Choice
"Important and informative.... [The book] provides valuable insight not only regarding the wars of the post-9/11 era but also about the activities of the U.S. government in general."—National Review
About the Author
Dov S. Zakheim served as the under secretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the U.S. Department of Defense from May 2001 to April 2004. He also served in various Defense Department positions during the Reagan administration, including deputy undersecretary for planning and resources. Zakheim is the author of Flight of the Lavi: Inside a U.S.-Israeli Crisis (Brassey's).
Most helpful customer reviews
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful.
All 4 reviews were useless to me
By Margaret Jo Shepherd
I just finished Zakheim's book and came to my computer to find reviews in the hope that others' reviews would help me refine my opinions about the value of Dr. Zakheim's experience, observations, and interpretations. All 4 reviews were useless to me. None of them addressed the book's purported topic. Though I read it through and as carefully as I could, the book disappoints me. The book does read more like a memoir than a critical analysis of the mismanagement of the war in Afghanistan. I resented the amount of text devoted to Iraq given the book's subtitle. i think anyone who has been in Afghanistan and read books written the US role there is 2001 knows the author's main points: the diversion of resources to Iraq was a major impediment to success in Afghanistan; USAID is an ineffective instrument for humanitarian aid; and planning documents for Afghanistan are long on policy and objectives and shockingly short of implementation strategies. This book would have been more meaningful to me if the author had cut details of personal experience; kept the focus on Afghanistan; provided good examples of USAID's limitations; and of implementation strategies for important policy decisions. I also think he is inviting legitimate criticism when he claims that more money allocated to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2003 would have produced a very different outcome without attending to his concerns about USAID and the general absence of implementation strategies for policy decisions. The reviews are superficial. That may be a function of the book's content.
2 of 3 people found the following review helpful.
Middle East Quarterly brief review
By Amazon Customer
A Vulcan's Tale
How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan
by Dov S. Zakheim
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011. 335 pp. $32.95
Reviewed by Pratik Chougule
former State Department official
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2012
[...]
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The oft-repeated maxim attributed to Gustave Flaubert, "God is in the details," has a variant: "Governing is in the details," as Zakheim's memoir, a firsthand postmortem of the Bush administration's Afghanistan and Iraq policies, makes clear. The volume provides an insider's view not only on strategy but also on an underappreciated aspect of the history--the "practicalities of implementation."
Zakheim was one of the first advisors in 1998 to join the Bush campaign's foreign policy team, dubbed by Condoleezza Rice, the "Vulcans." He joined other, better-known names including Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, to help brief Bush on international issues and then moved on to the Department of Defense after the election.
The author demonstrates that problems with postwar reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted from factors incidental to the Bush administration's initial aversion to "nation-building." He stresses another crucial reason for the mismanaged reconstruction initiatives: mid-level bureaucratic disputes over appropriations between Congress, the Defense Department, and the Office of Management and Budget.
In his capacities as the Pentagon's comptroller, chief financial officer, and coordinator for Afghan civilian reconstruction, Zakheim negotiated with coalition partners to raise and disburse funds for the Afghanistan and Iraq missions. Describing these negotiations, Zakheim provides insights into the unfortunate realities of dealing with authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes. Notwithstanding the ostensible confluence of interest between these states and Washington, corruption, haggling, secrecy, double-talk, and false promises were a fact of life.
Zakheim illustrates the point with numbers. After the first Afghan donors' conference, for example, the government of Saudi Arabia pledged $220 million but disbursed $27 million; Kuwait disbursed $2 million of its $30 million pledge; and Qatar simply did not bother to follow up on its $12 million pledge. Zakheim's failed 2003 negotiations with Syrian charge d'affaires, Imad Moustapha, over frozen Iraqi assets--the highest-level Pentagon talks with Syria in years--reveal the futility of the Bush administration's attempted rapprochement with Damascus.
Zakheim unintentionally reveals a major shortcoming in the White House's Afghanistan strategy: By repeatedly defending the Bush record vis-à-vis Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, he highlights the administration's inability to recognize and deal with Pakistan's double-game of cooperating with Washington while inciting instability across its borders.
A Vulcan's Tale is weaker in its strategic analysis. Zakheim advances the oft-repeated charge that the "rush to war with Iraq" detracted from the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Especially given his intimate involvement with the issue, Zakheim's discussion is simplistic and ultimately unconvincing, relying too much on anecdotes about administration officials' supposed inattention to Afghanistan. He downplays, for example, the fact that almost immediately after the start of the 2003 Iraq war, the Bush administration doubled funding for Afghanistan reconstruction and greatly increased the size of the country's national army and police.
Overall, Zakheim's memoir remains useful in explaining the impact that U.S. decisions after 9/11 had on subsequent outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Related Topics: Central Asia, US policy | Spring 2012 MEQ
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8 of 12 people found the following review helpful.
Completes a large part of the big picture of Iraq's and Afghanistan's successes and failures.
By Brian D. Perry Sr.
When I first mentioned to Dov Zakheim that he should write a book about his time as the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) he responded at the time that so many people were writing their take on events. So he would wait.
I am glad that he did not wait too long. This book is a needed piece of the historical puzzle of our experience as a nation at war. It will fill gaps in behind the scenes daring do with a philosophical analysis of the events. You do not have to wait for the historian to piece together their version of the truth of the matter as we have Dr. Zakheim's actual activities AND his deep and thoughtful "take" on how his part in the events shaped an outcome.
I had the honor of being assigned to the Under Secretary as his senior military advisor for international finance and foreign assistance. At least, that is what my officer evaluation report states that he signed for me as an Army Colonel. In reality, he advised me by being candid, kind and showing a real humility for all those around him.
It was an honor to have traveled with him to Korea, Afghanistan and Iraq. We flew in a cargo plan in the war zones as he wanted to see the war from every angle, from every point of view. I listened to him discuss war finances with generals, diplomats, war lords, and the lowest of soldiers. (He even took time from his busy schedule to swear my son into the Army.)
He is smarter than anyone I have every had the pleasure of serving with, and deeply cares about seeing the world, as I would suggest, could be considered a "humane realist." That is, he knows war, understands the balance of power role he was major part of, yet took a more personal view. Aware of the people who would be affected by the decisions and efforts he made.
This book is the perfectly matched puzzle piece that completes a large part of the big picture of Iraq's and Afghanistan's successes and failures. Please read it with the understanding the events happened as he says and his analysis, of the events I was a part of, are spot on.
COL (r) Brian D. Perry Sr
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