Free Ebook Back Channel Negotiation: Security in Middle East Peace Process (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution), by Anthony Wanis-St J
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Back Channel Negotiation: Security in Middle East Peace Process (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution), by Anthony Wanis-St J
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Wanis-St. John takes on the question of whether the complex and often perilous, secret negotiations between mediating parties prove to be an instrumental path to reconciliation or rather one that disrupts the process. Using the Palestinian-Israeli peace process as a framework, the author focuses on the uses and misuses of “back channel” negotiations. Wanis-St. John discusses how top level PLO and Israeli government officials often resorted to secret negotiation channels even when they had designated, acknowledged negotiation teams already at work. Intense scrutiny of the media, pressure from constituents, and the public’s reaction, all become severe constraints to the process, causing leaders to seek out back channel negotiations. The impact of these secret talks on the peace process over time has largely been unexplored. Through interviews with major negotiators and policymakers on both sides and a detailed history of the conflict, the author analyzes the functions and consequences of back channel negotiations. Wanis-St. John reveals the painful irony that these methods for peacemaking have had the unintended effect of inflaming the conflict and sustaining its intractability.
- Sales Rank: #1104593 in Books
- Published on: 2011-02-02
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 9.30" h x 1.11" w x 6.37" l, 1.40 pounds
- Binding: Hardcover
- 352 pages
About the Author
Anthony Wanis-St. John is assistant professor at American University in Washington, D.C. He is an advisor to the United States Institute of Peace and has consulted with the World Bank. He has facilitated several workshops for Palestinian and Israeli official negotiation staff and advisors.
Most helpful customer reviews
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful.
Defies conventional wisdom on secret negotiations
By Suzanne Ghais
Very thoroughly researched exploration of secret ("back channel") and publicly known ("front channel") negotiations in the many years of the Israel-Palestine peace process going back to the mid-1980s. While the conventional wisdom in negotiation is that you often need secrecy to prevent unproductive posturing and make any progress toward settlement, Wanis-St. John shows that there is a high cost to this strategy: negotiators increasingly lose touch with or even alienate their constituents, and while agreements might get signed, implementation and thus true resolution become more elusive. Hence you have the high hopes after the (secretly negotiated) Oslo accords that faded to the frustration behind the second intifada and the despair we see now.
While this book might be seen as a single case study, the author breaks that case down into multiple instances of both back- and front-channel negotiations to allow comparisons of the two channels, which often take place simultaneously (i.e., there has on many occasions been a secret negotiation at the same time as a non-secret one, allowing us to compare and contrast the two). In this manner the results become easier to generalize to more cases, though certainly the Israel/Palestine case is saddled with a uniquely high degree of public visibility. The sources of data include published first-hand accounts as well as numerous interviews conducted by the author, exposing some secret negotiations that were, I believe, previously unknown to the public. A great read both for people interested in the Middle East conflict and for those seeking more theoretical treatment of peacemaking and negotiation issues.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful.
Middle East Peace Process made comprehensible!
By Maija Jespersen
In America, mainstream media portrays the situation in the Middle East as a bunch of lying, uncontrollable thug terrorists being barely controlled by the most moral military on earth. Other news sources present the opposite point of view; Israel as an unjust occupation. The only thing most of them can agree on is that peace would be an improvement. With so many international actors interested in peace in the region, as well as the Israelis and Palestinians themselves being largely unhappy about continued violence, why is it that peace agreement after peace agreement either fails to materialize, or is signed and then not implemented?
Wanis St.-Jonh's book delves into this question with depth and precision. He explores the difference between, and the simultaneous use of, front and back channel negotiations -- in other words, negotiations subject to public scrutiny and pressure, and those which are held in secret. Each have their ideal uses and are subject to different spoiler factors. The book also traces the influence that the change of political leadership and of political climate had for the negotiation processes, in Israel, Palestine, and the United States, and the changing roles played by the key characters over time. It weaves the whole tapestry.
This book is valuable for both a theoretical understanding of negotiation processes, and for a fact-based look at the actual events in the Middle East. The author does not seem to have a particular bias, which I think makes his analysis even more cogent.
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful.
Negotiation tactics review
By Jeff
This book takes a look at Israeli Palestinian relations as well as Israeli and other regional Arabic country relations since the formation of Israel under U.N. decree in 1947 until as recently as 2010. Israel's tense relationship with Palestine is a microcosm of the entire regions sentiments towards Israel and solving this one problem could lead to calmer and more peaceful Middle East. Due to the extremely emotional and negative sentiments both sides have toward the other it has become increasingly difficult for either side to form a large enough internal coalition that is willing to make concessions and reach a peace accord. Public opinion again on both sides is that they are dealing with the "devil" and neither side wants to publicly concede anything. However leaders on both sides understand the need for negotiation and concessions in order to bring about peace. Therefore since neither side has the political power to make these concessions openly they have been engaging in what Anthony Wanis-St. John terms Back Channel Negotiations (BCN). BCN are secret meetings held by political leaders who have been authorized to engage in negotiations and make decisions. Henry Kissinger championed these types of negotiations during his time with the White House and as Secretary of State and proven their usefulness in reaching agreements. The main purpose of this book was to analyze the both the function and impact of BCN in what I would term the failed Israeli Palestinian peace talks.
Back channel negotiations became a necessity for both sides in the Israeli Palestinian peace process because of the very negative public opinions on both sides. Both viewed the other as "devils", and understandably so. Back channel negotiations were used in conjunction with front channel negotiations and had their benefits and faults.
Back channel negotiations were often considered more effective and groundbreaking because of their ability to remove the "audience" from the negotiation. Both Palestine and Israel felt that they have strong claims to Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem and public opinions were varied to the level of concessions they were willing to make. This caused more disagreements between intra-negotiations then with the extra-negotiations. By removing the public from the aspects of the negotiations leaders could make concessions to the "devil" without fear of losing political power or public backlash, "Policy must be freed from public opinion". Back channel negotiators were often empowered to make real on the spot decisions about what terms could and would be accepted vs. front channel negotiators who were usually further from their leaders and had little to no autonomy. In the case of Israel and Palestine the first major breakthrough in the peace talks were to be made in the form of the Oslo Accords in 1993. These were secret BCN where Israel and Palestine had an interim agreement with set conditions, such as general elections for Palestinians, removal of Israeli security forces in certain cities and the return of detainees, among many other things. Major concessions had been made by both sides and part of the interim agreement was that within 5 years a permanent accord would be signed, with talks starting no later than 1996. This accord seemed like the major breakthrough both sides were looking for; Palestine conceded Israel's right to exist, held open elections, security responsibilities turned over to them, returned detainees, and hopefully a sovereign state soon. Israeli's could work with a legitimate governing body and would be free from fear of future attacks by the Palestinians. However this is really where the process broke down and BCN flaws become apparent.
Many of the flaws associated with BCN come from its strength of secrecy. BCN allowed top political leaders to make decisions without the need for overwhelming support from their party or anyone on their side. Once the Oslo Accords were made public leaders on both sides faced extremely public scrutiny and political alienation in particular Israel. Signing such a revolution document cost then Prime Minister Rabin not only his position but his life. It makes sense that Israel would have more trouble reaching a coalition for two reasons, one they have a stronger democratic system with many different candidates and two they truly hold all the cards in these negotiations. They are the only ones who stand to lose anything in the form of conquered territories. Whereas Palestine feels that it has been conquered and the return of anything less than 100% of their land is a concession. After Prime Minister Rabin assignation by an Israeli Zionist and a short interim Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was elected to the position and termed a "spoiler" by Wanis-St. John for his lack of commitment to the peace process. Netanyahu began to not meet deadlines for detainee returns and troops withdrawals set out in the publicly unpopular Oslo Accords. This only fueled anger, resentment and distrust on the Palestinian side, leading to riots and violence. The violence was then used as justification by Netanyahu to not follow through with the accords and a viscous cycle began and peace became permanently derailed.
Wanis-St. John highlights five key take-aways to using BCN in peace agreements:
* BCN used in international conflicts will facilitate early breakthrough agreements, as both sides can come together and form a level of mutual understanding without "spoiler" interactions.
* BCN will yield less and less useful results in the form of more difficult implementation of existing agreements and more constraints on future agreements.
* Decision makers face an implementation dilemma once they sign an agreement through BCN.
* BCN lead to more BCN if not carefully managed due to the reactions of spoilers.
* Negotiations that rely on BCN proceed from breakthroughs to diminished to negative returns.
Overall I truly enjoyed the book and felt that there were a lot of valuable lessons to be learned from the stages of peace process between Israel and Palestine. In particular I felt that this case and BCN really ties in very closely with the lessons we have learned in class, specifically dealing with the devil, mediation through understanding and complex multiparty negotiations. I cannot fathom the mutual distain that many Palestinians and Israelis have for each other. Both sides must honestly feel like they are dealing with the "devil" in negotiating with the other side, as both are guilty of heinous acts of violence against the other. Peace can only be attained through an agreement and both parties need to come to that conclusion before anything will be signed. I think part of the reason why BCNs were so effective was that it allowed the parties to come together and reaching an understanding of the other side's point of view and their needs, it made the "devils" seem human again. Lastly the main flaw in BCN is the failure to form an internal coalition and agreement before reaching an agreement with the other-side. It was truly internal politics that killed the peace process in Israel not external disagreements. In conclusion I would say that BCNs between Israel and Palestine bring to light many of complex issues that we have been discussing in class and that in order for a peace agreement to be reached both sides of the public have to reach an understanding that they need to make concessions to reach an agreement, and that it may feel like giving it to the devil but it is really freeing themselves from needless violence.
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